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Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium model in which longer working time and higher labor
force participation lead to a fall in unemployment. Longer working hours and higher
labor force participation have two direct effects: People have higher incomes and less
(leisure) time. This has implications for the composition of consumer demand, since
people spend less time on home production. Instead, they outsource more domestic
tasks to the market. Consumer demand shifts toward unskill-intensive goods. The
relative demand for unskilled labor rises and unemployment falls.
We provide empirical evidence for our theoretical predictions in several ways: We
study the link between labor market participation, home production and the demand
for household and similar services using the German time use survey conducted in
1991/92. In addition, we use panel data for 23 OECD countries between 1980 and 2003
to directly examine the link between labor force participation and the unemployment
rate. The empirical results corroborate the predictions from the theoretical model.
Keywords: Working Time Reduction, Labor Force Participation, Low Skill Employ-
ment, Home Production, Time Use
JEL Classification: J22, J23, E21, E24
1 Introduction
In this paper, we present and test a general equilibrium model in which increases in
labor supply trigger an increase in the relative demand for unskilled labor and therefore
improve the labor market prospects of unskilled workers. This feedback effect works
through changes in the composition of consumer demand respectively changes in home
production.
∗We are grateful to Rob Alessie, Axel Bo¨rsch-Supan, Alfred Garloff, Dan Hamermesh, Karsten Hank,
Florian Heiss, Martin Hellwig, Hendrik Ju¨rges, Winfried Mu¨ller and JoachimWinter for valuable comments
and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
†MEA -Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging, Universita¨t Mannheim, L13,17, D-
68131 Mannheim. Email addresses: luehrmann@mea.uni-mannheim.de, weiss@mea.uni-mannheim.de.
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We consider three margins at which labor supply can change: labor force participation,
(weekly) working time and retirement age. Debates on increasing versus cutting down
on weekly working time,1 prolonging working life by raising the retirement age,2 and
increasing labor force participation particularly among women resurface periodically in
the political discussion. The arguments against or in favor of these policy measures are
well known. Opponents of increased labor market participation think that—for want of
jobs—it does not make much sense to have people work longer (hours or years) or to have
more people enter the labor force in times of high unemployment. This view is based on
what has become known as the “lump of labor fallacy”. It does not take into account
that changes in labor supply entail changes in income and consumer demand and thus
ultimately in labor demand. In other words, the amount of work to be done is not a
fixed lump. This idea that the economy adjusts to changes in labor supply—at least in
the long run—is well established among economists. Empirical studies on employment
effects of working time reduction are inconclusive. They generally suffer from the fact
that changes in working time usually involve changes in unit wage costs (e.g., working
time reduction with compensatory wage increases) and the effects of the two are hard
to separate (Calmfors and Hoel 1988; Calmfors and Hoel 1989; Hunt 1999; Logeay and
Schreiber 2006). A thorough review of the literature can be found in OECD (1998), pp.
117-148.3
This paper presents and empirically analyzes a new argument in this old debate. While
a voluminous empirical and theoretical literature on the employment effects especially of
working time reduction already exists, very few studies look at how different types of
workers are affected by these measures.4 In this paper, we show that changes in labor
supply effectuate changes not only in the level but also in the composition of the demand
for labor.
We consider an economy where neither wages nor productivities are affected by changes
in working time or labor force participation. The effects we find in our model are thus
independent of the arguments given in Footnote 3. A rise in working time or labor force
participation has two direct effects: Workers have higher incomes and less (leisure) time.
This change in the endowment of people is likely to have effects on the composition of
consumer demand. People with higher incomes can consume more. At the same time, they
1An increasing number of firms in Europe is currently returning to longer working hours in the face of
increasing global competition.
2Measures to increase retirement age have been set in place and are currently being discussed again in
order to finance pay-as-you-go funded social security systems in times of population aging.
3Calmfors and Hoel (1989) give five reasons of why working time reduction might actually lead to a
reduction in labor demand: (i) Wage rates per unit of time may rise. (ii) Even if wage rates remain
constant, wage costs per unit of time may rise due to the existence of fixed costs per employee. (iii) Labor
productivity per hour may fall because the proportion of ”non-productive” time devoted to starting up
and finishing work may rise. (iv) The factor cost of employing new workers rises relative to the cost of
increasing overtime when standard hours are cut. (v) Capital utilization will decrease to the extent that
the operating time of the capital stock is reduced pari passu with working time.
4Corneo (1995) is a notable exception.
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have less time at their disposal. Due to these endowment changes, they raise expenditures
on those goods or services, that they have “produced” on their own so far. Examples of
such outsourcing of home production are house cleaning, preparing food (using a pizza
delivery service rather than making it at home,...), car washing, fixing bicycles, ironing
shirts, walking dogs, repairs at home, do-it-yourself, child care, etc. The goods that
everyone can make on their own are exactly those that can be “produced” by unskilled
workers. So, as a consequence of growing labor supply, consumer demand shifts towards
goods and services that are supplied mostly by unskilled workers and the relative demand
for unskilled labor rises.
In the model economy considered in this paper, individuals maximize their utility over
consumption and leisure and allocate their time over three types of activities: market
work, home production, and leisure. Consumption is not equal to expenditures in our
model, but consists of goods and services purchased on the market as well as self-produced
goods.5 We study the effects of changes in labor market participation in the absence of
compensatory wage changes or any other change in unit labor costs. Hence, our argument
is independent of potential union or policy-induced wage-setting schemes. Unemployment
in this model emerges because wages are downwardly rigid.6 The adverse effects of this
rigidity of wages are (obviously) especially strong at the lower end of the skill distribution.
Given this concentration of unemployment at unskilled labor, exogenous changes that
increase the demand for products that are intensive in the use of unskilled labor have
positive employment effects. The employment effects are shown to be more severe, the
more complementary are the consumer goods and leisure.
In the second part of this paper, we provide empirical evidence for the basic mechanisms
of our model. We analyze the empirical link between market work, home production
and the demand for goods and services that are substitutes for home production at the
household level, and we investigate the macroeconomic relation between labor supply
measures and unemployment.
We proceed in three steps: First, we use the German time use survey from 1991/92 and
investigate whether the time spent on home production activities differs by household labor
supply. We find evidence of decreasing time spent on home production upon higher labor
supply, encompassing working hours and labor force participation. However, looking at
the allocation of time does not clarify whether home production is simply reduced without
any compensatory outsourcing.7 Complementarily, we also look at a well-defined subset
of services substituting for home production using the same survey and analyze whether
outsourcing increases upon higher labor supply. Again, we find evidence supporting our
5The argument that consumption is more than expenditures goes back to Becker (1965) and Gronau
(1977).
6Labor market frictions that entail downward rigidity of wages include unemployment benefits, mini-
mum wages, welfare aid, wage-compression due to strong unions, etc.
7In the following, we will use the term “outsourcing” to describe the act of buying household services
and other home-producible goods and services instead of producing them in the household.
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prediction, that outsourcing increases when market work rises. The third mechanism
of our model, that this increased outsourcing of home production raises the demand for
unskilled labor, cannot be quantified using this data, since there is no matching information
on sectoral production functions. Hence, we use macroeconomic panel data on OECD
countries and directly test the reduced form relation between labor supply measures and
unemployment. The results corroborate the prediction from the theoretical model.
A number of studies has provided empirical support for some of the mechanisms of
our model: The research project DEMPATEM surveyed in Schettkat and Salverda (2004)
presents evidence that the demand for services in general has increased over time, partly
due to the increased labor force participation of women. The focus of DEMPATEM is
on international differences in the structure of consumer demand, especially in the types
of services demanded. The German case study in this international comparison project
analyzes the determinants of changes in the structure of consumer demand, including labor
force participation as an explanatory variable (Van Deelen and Schettkat 2004). However,
the authors only investigate the differences between workers and nonworkers and do not
take into account the amount of time worked. They find that “the second earner seems
to push up (general) service expenditures”.
Special attention to household services is given in Bru¨ck, Haisken-DeNew, and Zimmer-
mann (2003). They show that the demand for household services is very income-elastic,
and that there is potentially a large market for such services. We additionally show,
that not only an increasing income, but also the decrease in disposable time raises the
demand for household services and other substitutes for home production. Both effects
together imply that increased labor supply can create jobs for the unskilled—via changes
in consumer demand.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we develop the the-
oretical model. In Section 3, we provide empirical support for the theoretical predictions
of our model. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2 The theoretical model
The economy is populated by a continuum of measure 1 of heterogeneous households
indexed by skill level j ∈ [0, 1]. Within each household, all members have the same skill
level. For simplicity, we assume that the entire age distribution is represented in each
household. A share λ of household members per cohort participates in the labor force.
Working age ranges from 0 to retirement age ρ. Life ends at age 1. For a worker’s labor
market prospects, only the skill level plays a role while age (as long as it is below ρ) is
irrelevant. Working time per worker is ω units of labor per period. Labor supply of each
household ξ is equal to the individual working time ω times the integral over all cohorts
(within that household) from 0 to ρ and over those workers who actually participate in
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the labor force:
ξ = ρ · λ · ω.
In order to be able to make comparative statics with respect to labor supply, we model λ,
ρ, and ω as exogenous. For simplicity, we set these parameters equal across households,
skill-levels, and cohorts. Heterogeneity with respect to these parameters would amplify
the complexity of the model without generating any further insights. Households have
preferences over two consumer goods and leisure, and can engage in home production.
Unemployment arises because of a minimum wage which depends on the average income
level (see Subsection 2.2).8
2.1 Production in firms
Both goods are produced by a continuum of measure 1 of homogeneous firms using all
types of labor. Good h can be produced at home or purchased, while good m is a pure
market good, that can only be purchased. Goodm is chosen as nume´raire. The technology
for good i is
yi =
∫ 1
0
e(1+χi)·j · ni,j · dj (1)
where ni,j is labor input of skill type j for the production of good i. Marginal productivity
∂yi
∂ni,j
= e(1+χi)·j is increasing with skill level j for both goods.9 χi is a productivity
parameter reflecting differential comparative advantage of skills. χm > χh implies that the
production of good m is more skill-intensive, i.e., the productivity advantage of workers
with higher skills (higher j) is larger in sector m. For simplicity, we set χh = 0 and
χm = χ > 0. Firms act as price-takers on input and output markets. Maximizing profits
pii = pi ·
∫ 1
0
e(1+χi)·j · ni,j · dj −
∫ 1
0
wj · ni,j · dj (2)
leads to demand for type j labor in sector i:
ndi,j =

∞ ⇔ wj < pi · e(1+χi)·j
[0,∞) ⇔ wj = pi · e(1+χi)·j
0 ⇔ wj > pi · e(1+χi)·j
(3)
where wj is the wage for type j labor and pi is the price of good i.
Figure 1 illustrates the allocation of types to sectors. On the horizontal axis is the
space of types. On the vertical axis are the equilibrium wages in the two sectors as
functions of the type j. Workers supply labor to the firm that offers the highest wage. In
8If wages were perfectly flexible, i.e., without unemployment, the model would yield similar effects:
An increase in market work would lead to higher employment, especially among the unskilled, and to a
decrease in wage inequality. Only if labor demand were perfectly inelastic, employment would remain
unchanged and we would only observe a change in wage inequality.
9The exponential specification implies that the distribution of labor income is skewed to the right.
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Figure 1: Allocation of Types j to Sectors
equilibrium, firms in sector h pay wj = p · ej while firms in sector m pay wj = e(1+χ)·j .10
This difference in wages determines the allocation of types to sectors. Type ˆ = ln p
1
χ is
indifferent between working in sector 1 and working in sector 2. All lower types prefer
working in sector 1 while all higher types prefer working in sector 2. The higher is the
relative price of good 1, the more skill types prefer to work in sector 1. The productivity
advantage χ of sector 2 has a negative direct effect on ˆ but an indirect effect through p
which might counteract the direct effect. For a discussion of the interaction between these
two effects, see Weiss (2004).
Equilibrium wages for different types of workers are thus
wj =
{
p · ej ⇔ j < ln p 1χ
e(1+χ)·j ⇔ j ≥ ln p 1χ .
(4)
Retirement age ρ ∈ [0, 1], labor force participation λ ∈ [0, 1], and fixed working time
ω ∈ [0, 1] restrict labor supply of households at each skill level j to ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Labor supply
in the two sectors is thus given by
nsh,j =

ξ ⇔ j < ln p 1χ
∈ [0, ξ] ⇔ j = ln p 1χ
0 ⇔ j > ln p 1χ
nsm,j =

0 ⇔ j < ln p 1χ
ξ − ns1,j ⇔ j = ln p
1
χ
ξ ⇔ j > ln p 1χ
. (5)
Goods supply is given by
yh =
∫ ln p 1χ
0
ej · ξ · dj = ξ ·
(
p
1
χ − 1
)
ym =
∫ 1
ln p
1
χ
e(1+χ)·j · ξ · dj = ξ · e
1+χ − p 1+χχ
1 + χ
.
(6)
10The price of the nume´raire, good m, is normalized to 1. We assume that parameter constellations are
such that production is positive in both sectors. This implies a relative goods price p = ph
pm
larger than 1.
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Supply of good h (m) is increasing (decreasing) in the relative goods price p. Supply of
both goods is increasing in labor supply ξ. χ which represents the productivity advantage
of sector m has a negative (positive) effect on the supply of good h (m).
2.2 Wage rigidity and unemployment
Unemployment in this model is due to a downward rigidity of wages. We assume that
the wage cannot fall below a minimum w˜ which is indexed to the average income level
in the economy.11 This assumption introduces a rigidity that keeps relative wages from
adjusting perfectly to changes in relative labor demand. Therefore, changes in relative
labor demand affect employment. This sort of rigidity in the relative wage arises if strong
unions ensure a compressed wage structure, if a legal minimum wage exists that is indexed
to the average wage, or if welfare aid or unemployment benefits depend on the average
income. Another source of such a rigidity in the relative wage could be considerations of
fairness as, e.g., put forward in the “fair wage-effort hypothesis” by Akerlof and Yellen
(1988) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and recently confirmed in a series of experimental
studies surveyed by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000).12 In this model, w˜ should be seen as a
simple means to capture all these phenomena leading to a rigidity in the relative wage.13
We assume that the “minimum wage” w˜ is a constant fraction θ of the average wage:
w˜ = θ ·
∫ 1
j˜
wj · dj = θ ·
(
χ · p 1+χχ + e1+χ
1 + χ
− p · ej˜
)
(7)
where j˜ is the type whose market wage is equal to the minimum wage. All higher types
receive higher wages while all lower types are unemployed. So, j˜ also represents the fraction
of unemployed workers.
The unemployment rate j˜ is determined by the equality of the minimum wage w˜ and
the market wage of a type j˜ worker, wj˜ :
θ ·
(
χ · p 1+χχ + e1+χ
1 + χ
− p · ej˜
)
!= p · ej˜ .
11In France, Japan, Spain (among others), the statutory minimum wage is explicitly indexed to the
average wage (see Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), page 715). In other countries, this link might not be
as explicit, but by and large, wages at the lower end of the distribution are usually somehow tied to the
evolution of average wages over time. This assumption is not crucial for the results. On the contrary, the
endogeneity of the minimum wage is moderating the employment effect of changes in labor supply.
12The fair wage-effort hypothesis is motivated by equity theory in social psychology and social exchange
theory in sociology. According to this hypothesis, workers withdraw effort as their actual wage falls short
of what they consider their “fair wage”. Such behavior causes unemployment by introducing a downward
rigidity in wages. Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) have shown that individual conceptions of fair
wages often diverge substantially from the levels that would clear competitive labor markets. See Weiss
and Garloff (2005) for a detailed discussion of causes and effects of rigidities in the relative wage.
13In a system of union wages classified by skill levels, w˜ can be seen as the lowest wage level in this
classification. For ease of labeling, we will in the remainder of the paper refer to w˜ as the minimum wage.
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Solving for j˜ yields the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The rate of unemployment j˜ is given by
j˜ = ln
(
θ
1 + θ
· χ · p
1+χ
χ + e1+χ
p · (1 + χ)
)
. (8)
It is increasing in θ and decreasing in p.
Not surprisingly, the more generous is the minimum wage (the higher θ ), the higher is
the rate of unemployment.
The effect of the relative goods price p corresponds to the so-called Stolper-Samuelson-
Effect in trade theory. An increase in the relative price of good h leads to an increase
in the relative demand for lower types of labor (in which the production of good h is
intensive). This change in relative labor does not fully translate into respective changes
in the relative wage so that employment increases.14
Note that working life ρ, working time ω, and labor force participation λ do not have
any direct effect on unemployment j˜ in the model. It is shown in the next section that
they affect employment through their effect on the relative goods price p.
Figure 2: Allocation of Types j to Sectors and Unemployment
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of the minimum wage on employment. For the high
types, the wage they can earn in sector m exceeds the wage they would receive in sector h.
Therefore, they work in sector m. The medium range types earn a higher wage in sector
h than in sector m. These types work in sector h. The low types, whose market value in
both sectors falls short of the minimum wage, cannot find a job.
14If wages were perfectly flexible, unemployment would not exist and an increase in labor supply would—
via this Stolper-Samuelson-Effect—translate into a decrease in wage inequality.
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An increase in the relative price of good h, p, exerts an upward pressure on the wage
in sector h. In terms of Figure 2, an increase in p implies an upward shift of the solid line.
For the highest unemployed types, the wage is pushed above the minimum wage. They
find employment, so that total unemployment decreases.15
The effect of labor supply on the relative goods price p depends on consumer demand
which is analyzed in the next subsection.
2.3 Consumption and home production
All households share the same preferences over consumption and leisure
Uj (ch,j , cm,j , lj) =
(
cγh,j + c
γ
m,j + l
γ
j
) 1
γ (9)
where lj is leisure time of a type j household, ci,j is consumption of good i, and σ = 11−γ
is the elasticity of substitution between consumption of good h, consumption of good m,
and leisure.16
Good h is either bought on the market at price p or produced at home with technology
yhph,j = α · hpj (10)
where hpj is the time that a type j household devotes to home production and α is a
productivity parameter. We assume that at home, skill types do not differ in productivity.
This assumption is made for simplicity. It has no qualitative effect on the results as long
as lower types have a comparative advantage in the production of the good that can be
produced at home. Good m is bought on the market at price 1.
For employed households, the budget and time constraints are respectively
p ·
(
ch,j − yhph,j
)
+ cm,j = wj · ξ and lj + hpj + ξ = 1 (11)
For unemployed households, the budget and time constraints are respectively17
p ·
(
ch,j − yhp1,j
)
+ cm,j = 0 and lj + hpj = 1 (12)
15The intersection between the solid line (wage in sector h) and the dotted line (minimum wage) moves to
the left. In fact, the dotted line (the minimum wage) shifts upward as well, but this shift is less pronounced
because the minimum wage is indexed to both, the wage in sector h (which increases) and the wage in
sector m (which remains unchanged).
16For simplicity, we assume, that within a household, consumption and leisure of all household members
are aggregated before they enter the joint utility function.
17To keep things simple, we assume that there are no unemployment benefits. Unemployed households
live on their home production.
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Maximizing utility (9) subject to the constraints (10) through (12) yields
ch,j =

α
1
1−γ
1+α
γ
1−γ ·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
« ⇔ j < j˜
α
1
1−γ ·
“
wj ·ξ
α·p +(1−ξ)
”
1+α
γ
1−γ ·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
« ⇔ j ≥ j˜
cm,j =

(α·p)
1
1−γ
1+α
γ
1−γ ·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
« ⇔ j < j˜
(α·p)
1
1−γ ·
“
wj ·ξ
p·α +1−ξ
”
1+α
γ
1−γ ·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
« ⇔ j ≥ j˜
(13)
lj =

1
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
⇔ j < j˜
wj ·ξ
α·p +1−ξ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
⇔ j ≥ j˜
hpj =

„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
⇔ j < j˜
(1−ξ)·
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ −wj ·ξ
α·p
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
⇔ j ≥ j˜
(14)
Consumption of good h (m) is decreasing (increasing) in the relative goods price. Leisure
is also decreasing in the relative price of the home-producible good h. The higher the
price for good h, the higher is the opportunity cost of leisure because time can also be
used to produce good h. Home production time is increasing in the relative price (of
the home-producible good h). The implications of an increase in market work for home
production and outsourcing are summarized in Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 At a given goods price p, an increase in retirement age ρ, labor force partici-
pation λ, or working time ω leads to a decrease in home production, hpj, and an increase
in outsourcing, osj = ch,j − hpj.
∂hpj
∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
∂p=0
< 0,
∂osj
∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
∂p=0
> 0whereξ = ρ · λ · ω. (15)
2.4 General equilibrium
In the following, we assume that the parameter constellation is such that (i) production in
both sectors is strictly positive, (ii) unemployment is strictly positive and strictly below
100%, and (iii) all types of households spend some strictly positive amount of time on
home production.
Definition 1 An equilibrium corresponds to a price system
{
{wj}j∈[0,1] , {pi}i=h,m
}
and
an allocation
{
{cij}j∈[0,1],i=h,m , {lj}j∈[0,1] , {hpj}j∈[0,1] , {yi}i=h,m ,
{
yhp1,j
}
j∈[0,1]
}
that sat-
isfy the following conditions:
• (Utility Maximization): Given the price system
{
{wj}j∈[0,1] , {pi}i=h,m
}
, the strat-
egy
{
{cij}i=h,m , lj , hpj
}
maximizes the utility (9) of each household of type j ∈ [0, 1]
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under the technological constraint (10), and the respective budget and time con-
straints (11) or (12).
• (Profit Maximization): Given the price system
{
{wj}j∈[0,1] , {pi}i=h,m
}
, the pro-
duction plan
{
{ni,j}j∈[0,1] , yi
}
maximizes profits (2) of each firm in sector i.
• (Market Clearing):
For each consumer good i = h,m :
∫ 1
0 ci,j · dj = yi.
For each production factor j ∈ [0, 1] : ∑mi=h ni,j = ξ.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions (i), (ii), and (iii), an equilibrium exists and is unique.
The relative goods’ price p as a function of technology parameters α, χ, preference parame-
ter γ, institutional parameter θ, labor force participation λ, retirement age ρ, and working
time ω is given implicitly by
(α · p) γ1−γ ·
α · p · ln
(
θ
1+θ · χ·p
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
p·(1+χ)
)
+ χ·p
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
(1+θ)·(1+χ) +
1−ξ
ξ · α · p
1 +
(
1 + p
γ
1−γ
)
· α γ1−γ
=
e1+χ − p 1+χχ
1 + χ
(16)
where ξ = ρ · λ · ω.
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.1.
Proposition 2 An increase in retirement age ρ, labor force participation λ, or working
time ω leads to an increase in the relative goods price p:
∂p
∂ρ
> 0
∂p
∂λ
> 0
∂p
∂ω
> 0. (17)
Proof. See Appendix 5.1.2.
Increases in retirement age, labor force participation and working time all imply a rise in
market work. An increase in market work makes households reduce home production and
demand more of good h from the market. As a consequence, the relative price of good h
rises.
From Lemma 1 we know that unemployment j˜ depends on the relative goods price p.
This is the channel through which market work ξ affects unemployment.
Proposition 3 An increase in retirement age ρ, labor force participation λ, or working
time ω leads to a decrease in the unemployment rate j˜. This effect—in terms of ∂j˜∂ξ · ξj˜—
is stronger the smaller is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
σ = 11−γ .
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Proof. See Appendix 5.1.3.
As stated in Proposition 2, an increase in market work leads to an increase in the relative
price of good h. This shifts relative demand for lower types (in which the production of
good h is intensive) upward. This lifts the wages of some hitherto unemployed types above
the minimum wage. They find employment and unemployment falls.
What is the role of the substitution elasticity in this effect? If substitutability is high,
an increase in market work can easily be offset by a respective decrease in home production
without the need for drastic changes in goods and factor prices. In this case, the wage
rigidity does only little harm. In the extreme case of perfect substitutes, the relative goods
price is equal to 1 and the unemployment rate is j˜ = ln
(
θ
1+θ · χ+e
1+χ
1+χ
)
independently of
market work ξ. If on the contrary substitutability is low, substantial changes in relative
goods and factor prices are required to induce changes in consumption and leisure following
an increase in market work. In this case, the wage rigidity has larger effects.
In summary, our general equilibrium model introduces a new argument into the old
debate about the lump of labor fallacy. It is known that higher labor supply leads to
more production, higher incomes and thereby higher demand for goods and labor. Our
theoretical model shows that this increase in the demand for goods and services asymmet-
rically favors the demand for those goods and services whose production is intensive in
the use of unskilled labor. In consequence, while the induced increase in labor supply is
symmetric across all skill levels, the increase in labor demand is biased towards unskilled
labor. Given the concentration of unemployment at unskilled labor, this shift in relative
labor demand has positive employment effects.
3 The empirical analysis
In this section, we present evidence supporting our theory that increased market work
goes along with less home production, more outsourcing of household work and other
self-producible goods and lower unemployment. Our empirical evidence is organized as
summarized in Figure 3: Firstly, we investigate the allocation of time by household mem-
bers conditional on their working time (Section 3.3). We present direct evidence that less
time is spent on home production activities the more time the household members spend
on market work. In order to see whether home production is substituted by respective
market goods and services, we secondly investigate data on help received by the house-
hold, comprising household services, child care, care for elderly persons and technical help
(Section 3.4). This approach yields empirical evidence supporting our prediction that (a)
households with a higher labor market participation reduce their time spent on home pro-
duction, and (b) that they substitute these tasks by outsourcing, i.e., demanding services
and products that fulfill these tasks.
In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we consider two margins of labor market participation, namely
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changes in (weekly) working time and changes in labor force participation, particularly of
women. The effects of a prolonged working life are not analyzed. There are some recent
papers trying to explain the significant drop in consumer expenditures upon retirement
which also investigate whether these households substitute home production for some
goods and services formerly purchased at the market (Hamermesh 1984; Banks, Blundell,
and Tanner 1998; Hurd and Rohwedder 2003; Aguiar and Hurst 2005; Heathcote 2002).
Given the particular circumstances and needs of older (retired) people, the link between
the length of working life and home production is studied separately in Lu¨hrmann (2006).
The third mechanism of our model, that this increased outsourcing of home production
raises the demand for unskilled labor and reduces unemployment, cannot be analyzed using
the same data set, since there is no matching information on sectoral production functions.
Instead, we use macroeconomic data on OECD countries and directly estimate the reduced
form relation between measures of labor supply and the unemployment rate (Section 3.5).
We find that average working hours as well as the participation rate are negatively linked
with the unemployment rate in these countries.
Figure 3: Overview over the empirical analysis
3.1 The time use data
First, we use the German time budget survey (Zeitbudgeterhebung) from 1991/92 by the
Statistisches Bundesamt. We restrict the sample to West German households headed by
married or cohabiting couples in the working age group 20-60.18 Since only one wave
of the data is available, we conduct a cross sectional analysis. This implies that we
cannot account for unobserved heterogeneity. However, we can filter many dimensions of
inter-personal heterogeneity, because the survey contains a detailed set of household and
personal characteristics as well as regional characteristics.
The time use of each respondent is surveyed for two days. The respondents fill in
a time diary, which gives us the information on the total time spent on each activity
during a day. We follow the standard classification scheme to group activities into home
18We exclude East German households, because they had very different labor market dynamics directly
after the reunification in 1991/92. We use the provided sampling weights.
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production, working time and leisure time. The dependent variable home production, hp,
is characterized as time spent for food preparation and cleanup, cleaning inside or outside
the home, caring for clothes, plants and animals, time spent for shopping, home and car
repair, and all children-related activities or caring for other people. Our working time
variable, denoted ω, is time spent working, commuting to work, taking breaks while at
work, and searching for work.19 The distribution of working hours among the working by
sex is shown in Figure 4. For men, it is distinctly single-peaked around 9-10 hours per day
which corresponds to a full time job plus travel time etc. On the contrary, we see a very
different distribution of female working time with two peaks. The first and highest peak
is around 5 hours a day which accords with a part time job. The second and lower peak
is again around 9-10 hours per day.
Figure 4: Distribution of mean work hours per day by sex among the working
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3.2 A descriptive look at market work, home production, outsourcing
and the demand for unskilled labor
Since the German Time Use Survey has not been widely used by economists, we start
with a descriptive overview of the time allocation by sex and employment status. We
distinguish between women and men for two reasons: First, it is widely documented in
the literature (Beblo 1999; Van der Lippe, Tijdens, and De Ruijter 2004) that men and
women differ in their engagement in home production activities. Second, in contrast to
males, females exhibit a very heterogenous labor market participation, and policies aimed
at increasing labor force participation are often targeted at women.
General time use is split into three broad categories: Both, men and women, spend
19The last category, leisure, comprises time spent for sleeping and napping, washing, dressing, eating,
receiving medical care, and time spent for everything else.
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Table 1: Time use by sex (in % of total time)
market work leisure home production
(incl. breaks, commuting, job search) (incl. recreation, vol. work)
men 24.6 64.0 11.4
women 8.4 65.6 26.0
about two thirds of their day on leisure activities as defined in Section 3.1. However, they
differ substantially in how they spent the remaining time. While men spent 24.6 percent of
their total time on work-related activities and 11.4 percent on home production activities
on average, women allocate their time in the opposite manner (Table 1).20
Next, we decompose time use by employment status. Two things are worth noting
from Table 2: (1) Working men and women spent less than half as much time on home
production activities than their not working counterparts. (2) Differential work status
does not explain the gender differences in home production time.
Table 2: Average home production by sex and employment status in hours per day (resp.
% of total time)
all not working working
all part time fulltime
men 2:46 (11.5%) 4:14 (17.7%) 1:42 ( 7.1%) 3:17 (13.7%) 1:22 ( 5.7%)
women 6:11 (25.7%) 7:01 (29.2%) 4:23 (11.1%) 5:50 (24.3%) 1:33 ( 6.5%)
Decomposing time use by working time shows that women with a part time job spend
about an hour and 10 minutes less time on home production per day than not working
women, while full time employed women spend 5 and a half hours per day less on home
production (Table 2). Figure 5 illustrates this strong and negative relation between home
production and working time which is stronger for women. Even among men, the differ-
ences in home production by work status and hours are sizeable: Not working men take
care of the household about 4 hours and a quarter each day while full time employed men
only spend about an hour and 22 minutes on home production.
Next, we look at the relation between market work and outsourcing. We have informa-
tion on whether a household receives help from outside the household, and if so, how much.
Received help is classified in four categories, namely (1) help in the household (cleaning,
shopping, laundry), (2) child care, (3) care for elderly persons, and (4) technical help. We
summarize these four categories into one. 18.2% of all households under consideration an-
swered that they receive help from outside the household. 7.6% of all households received
help that was paid for.
20Brines (1994) and Greenstein (2000) put forward sociological factors to explain these gender differences.
Beblo (1999) analyzes strategic behavior in intra-family time allocation.
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Figure 5: Home production by sex and hours of work
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Table 3: Share of households receiving help, by employment status
Households members are...
Type of received help all both not employed one employed both employed
unpaid 11.6% 0.0% 7.1% 14.6%
paid 7.6% 2.3% 3.9% 10.0%
unpaid and paid 18.2% 2.3% 10.5% 23.3%
Table 3 furthermore illustrates, that the higher a household’s labor market participa-
tion, the higher is the probability that this household receives (unpaid and paid) help from
outside. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel, Hank (2001) presents similar numbers
and states that “dual career households use professional help the most.” The fraction
of households purchasing domestic services is highest among households in which women
spend many hours in market work.
3.3 Does increased market work lead to a reduction of home production?
The goal of this section is to investigate the relationship between labor market partic-
ipation and home production—as described in Lemma 2—in a multivariate setting. In
our model, households maximize their utility from consumption and leisure as specified
in equation (9). Producing goods and services at home saves money, but consumes time
resources that could be spent on leisure activities. Hence, households will have to weigh
the marginal cost of purchasing certain goods or services against the marginal cost of
producing them at home.
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We model the decision how much time a household j spends on home production per
day as a function of household characteristics Z, work characteristics λ, ω and η (defined
below), monthly household net income Inc and its interactions with labor force participa-
tion, and individual characteristics of the spouses X. Furthermore, we control for seasonal
and weekly patterns T and regional factors R.
The key work characteristics are minutes of market work by husband and wife ω, as mea-
sured on a diary day. We differentiate market work by husband and wife, because—given
the descriptive evidence from Section 3.2—we do not suppose that male and female market
work are perfect substitutes.21 Since we have separate information about general labor
force participation λ, and whether a person works on the specific day, at which home
production is recorded, we can at least partially control for inter-temporal substitution of
home production within a week. Hence, we include not only λ, but also a dummy taking
the value 1 if a person is generally employed but does not work on the diary day which
we denote as η.
The monthly income variable has been constructed from the individual net monthly in-
comes of husband and wife which are given in income brackets in the survey. We construct
a continuous household income variable by estimating an ordered probit model with known
cut points for the individual incomes and adding them up afterwards. This method and
its implications are discussed in Appendix 5.3. For a description of the other variables
used in the analysis see Appendix 5.2.
The empirical specification is the following:22
hpj = α+
∑
s
(
βλs · λs,j + βηs · ηs,j + βωs · ωs,j
)
+ (γ +
∑
s
γλs · λs,j) · Incj
+ βZ · Zj +
∑
s
βXs ·Xs,j + βT · Tj + βR ·Rj + ²j
(18)
where hp denotes total time per day spent on home production at day t in minutes. The
subscripts stand for household j and household member s where s can be the husband m
or the wife f . With this model, we can investigate whether there is empirical support for
our theoretical predictions from Lemma 2, that ∂hpj∂ξ |∂p=0 < 0, where ξ = ρ · λ · ω.23
Estimating equation 18 to evaluate our argument that the higher the household’s labor
supply, the less time will be spent on home production, gives the results depicted in Table
4. Column 1 shows a significant coefficient of male and female working time, ω. As
expected from Lemma 2, the more the household members work, the less time is spent
on home production. For example, if the wife works one hour more, home production
time of the household is reduced by 27 minutes. The magnitude of the effect is almost
21We include a participation dummy only for women, since there is almost no variation in male partici-
pation in the data.
22We omit the time subscript t denoting the diary day for ease of notation.
23The partial equilibrium perspective (∂p = 0) is taken here because—unlike in the theoretical model
where λ, ω, and ρ are taken to be equal across all individuals—a change in individual labor force par-
ticipation or working time does not have any (general equilibrium) effects on the relative goods price
p.
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Table 4: Regression results
dependent variable: total household home production
all w/o kids w/ kids
(1) (2) (3)
participation and minutes of work
ωf -0.449 (-16.84)*** -0.38 (-7.49)*** -0.478 (-13.72)***
ωm -0.256 (-13.31)*** -0.206 (-5.28)*** -0.299 (-13.36)***
λf 55.237 (1.82)* 101.306 (1.55) 31.989 (0.91)
ηf -5.02 (-0.40) 0.431 (0.02) -1.26 (-0.09)
ηm -3.373 (-0.30) 15.484 (0.65) -16.535 (-1.27)
household characteristics
Inc 0.019 (1.78)* 0.037 (1.54) 0.008 (0.66)
Inc2 -1.62E-06 (-1.85)* -3.15E-06 (-1.63) -6.33E-07 (-0.65)
Inc ∗ λf -0.024 (-2.16)** -0.043 (-1.76)* -0.014 (-1.12)
Inc2 ∗ λf 1.55E-06 (1.75)* 3.12E-06 (1.61) 6.05E-07 (0.60)
Kids0− 5 114.540 (21.35)*** 87.643 (14.14)***
Kids6− 18 27.340 (7.76)*** 16.762 (3.64)***
AgeAvg -0.332 (-0.79) 1.34 (1.83)* -2.384 (-3.56)***
AgeDiff 1.31 (1.70)* -0.564 (-0.35) 2.922 (3.25)***
SchoolY rsAvg -5.297 (-1.85)* -3.528 (-0.57) -4.093 (-1.26)
SchoolY rsDiff 1.583 (0.72) -8.844 (-1.67)* 6.403 (2.74)***
living conditions of the household
AppSize 0.079 (0.76) 0.526 (2.11)** -0.081 (-0.73)
AppOwner 17.346 (1.38) 7.314 (0.28) 25.068 (1.71)*
HOwner 41.777 (4.92)*** 51.261 (2.80)*** 26.847 (2.80)***
Garden 32.596 (3.99)*** 30.152 (1.84)* 41.967 (4.36)***
Constant 634.683 (9.94)*** 302.801 (2.20)** 842.761 (11.68)***
Obs. 4304 941 3363
Adj.R2 0.42 0.34 0.38
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *,**,*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
Additional regressors (not reported here): regional (Southern and Central Germany), seasonal and weekday
dummies, and regional characteristics like unemployment rates, gross national product, urbanization and
the size of the tertiary sector.
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twice as high compared to male working time. A t-test reveals that the difference between
the two coefficients is statistically significantly different from zero. Female labor force
participation λf during the week is weakly positively significant in specification (1), as are
its interactions with income and income squared. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis
of a joint difference from zero using an F-test (F (3, 4269) = 1.98). We also do not find
evidence of inter-temporal substitution of home production over the week, i.e., we see no
empirical evidence that employed household members do more home production on their
“free” days during the week. The overall effect of these three participation measures is
significantly negative, as will be shown below in Table 5.
One might argue that the supply or availability of child care might affect the labor
supply decision, rendering it endogenous. We deal with this endogeneity by including —
in all specifications— three broadly defined region dummies and four variables capturing
local unemployment rate, regional GNP per capita, the degree of urbanization, and the
size of the tertiary sector on a finer regional level. These regional characteristics are likely
correlated with the degree of availability of child care, as it is part of the tertiary sector,
varies by population density and urbanization of the area, and so forth. Hence, we use
them as proxies for the availability of child care and domestic services. None of these
regional variables has a significant impact on home production.
A second objection might be that there is a potential simultaneity of the work and
the home production choice which biases our OLS results: namely, that the labor supply
decision affects the household’s demand for child care, and vice versa. As a robustness
check, we split the sample into couples with and without children, because we suppose that
an endogeneity bias will be present mainly with regard to child care availability. Women
might decide to start working again when they can easily source out child care, i.e., when
the grandparents live close by or when professional child care is easily available. Hence,
childless couples should be affected to a much lesser extent. We find a slightly lower impact
of working time on home production in childless households (column 2) —about 7 minutes
difference compared to results from (1)— but the differences are not substantial.
Furthermore, we use the fact that we observe each person’s time use over two diary days
in order to estimate a fixed effect model which allows us to filter unobserved heterogeneity
like tastes for work and also the availability of home production substitutes. The results
are very similar to those shown in Table 4 and are contained in Appendix 5.4.
The total effect of female labor supply (including participation and working time) on
a household’s home production is shown in Table 5. The table displays the difference in
household home production time between a not working and a working woman. Increases
in market work imply accompanying pay raises which also affect home production time
and the amount of outsourcing. We take this into account using the differences in the
conditional mean incomes of households with full (part) time working women and those
with not working women in our sample. Furthermore, we assume an average hourly net
19
wage of 18.40 DM.24 We determine working time in a part- or full-time job from the
distribution of female working hours. Part-time is roughly defined as the lower peak value
at 5 hours per day, full-time as the higher peak value at 9.5 hours (see Figure 4).
Table 5: Net effect of female labor market participation on household home production
time (in hours per day)
not working woman vs. woman working woman working
...part time ...full time 1 h more
change in household
home production time -1:23 (-2.89)*** -3:28 (-7.13)*** -0:27 (-13.85)***
Note: t-values in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. The underlying Null hypothesis is
that the respective linear combination of coefficients is equal to zero.
The first (resp. second) column contains the difference in home production time be-
tween a household with a not working woman and one with a part (resp. full) time working
woman: it amounts to a considerable one hour and 23 minutes respectively three and a
half hours per day. In the third column, we calculate the effect of one additional work hour
which reduces the home production time of the household by 27 minutes. Thus, female
market work results in a statistically significant reduction in home production time. The
reduction is larger, the more hours a woman works.
Hence, our findings suggest that: (1) The more the spouses work, the less time is spent
on home production in the household. (2) This effect is almost double as large for women
than for men, and it is sizeable: One additional hour in market work crowds out almost
half an hour of household home production time.
Finally, we briefly comment on the results for the other household and personal charac-
teristics: We cannot find evidence of a direct effect of education on home production time,
that would be due to education-specific attitudes and tastes etc. We also do not find a
strong relation between age and home production. We additionally include quarterly and
weekday dummies into our estimation to capture seasonal effects in home production. For
example, the positive significant coefficients for the second quarter suggest that households
engage more actively in some outdoor home production tasks, e.g., repairing the house
or doing some gardening. Furthermore, descriptive evidence suggests that significantly
less home production is done on Sundays than during the week. This is probably due to
the fact that no shopping can be done on Sundays and that the Sunday is still widely
perceived as a leisure day and often reserved for family and social activities.
3.4 Does more market work result in more outsourcing?
In the preceding section, we analyzed the link between market work and the time spent
on home production. We found that more time spent on market work is associated with
24This number is computed from the IAB-Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe 1992.
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less time spent on home production. In this section, we use the data on “help received by
the household” described in Section 3.2 to study the link between market work of house-
hold members and the demand for these services.25 Lemma 2 makes the clear prediction
that increased market work leads to more outsourcing of home-producible goods and ser-
vices. The idea is that at least part of a household’s home production can in principle
be outsourced. Our measure “received” help does certainly not cover all components of
outsourcing, e.g., it excludes child care outside households (kindergartens, nurseries, etc.),
eating out, bringing clothes to the dry-cleaner, having them ironed and sewed and so forth.
Furthermore, only 7.6% of our sample households report to have received paid help. This
low percentage is most likely due to underreporting. In Germany, many household aids are
employed without official registration, as this would imply the duty to pay social security
contributions and taxes on both sides, employer and employee.26 For these two reasons,
we regard our analysis as a very conservative lower bound of the impact of labor market
participation on the demand for household services and the like.
We estimate the link between households’ labor market participation and their demand
for paid services that substitute for home production. We use the same specification as
in equation 18, just substituting received help rh for home production hp. Since only
7.6% of the households in our sample actually report to receive paid help, we observe a
large fraction of zeros for the dependent variable. Simplifying equation 18 for illustrative
purposes, we get: rh∗j = x
′
jβ + ²j where the error term is normally distributed, ²j ∼
N(0, σ2), and rh∗ | xj ∼ N(β′xj , σ2). The censored variable can be characterized as:
rh =
{
rh∗ if rh∗ > 0
0 else
(19)
The probability of observing positive outsourcing is: P (rh > 0) = P (rh∗ > 0) = Φ(β
′xj
σ ).
Hence, the Likelihood for the censored regression model is:
L =
n∏
j=0
[
Φ
(
x′jβ
σ
)]−1
· 1
σ
· φ
(
rhj − x′jβ
σ
)
(20)
Table 7 reports the regression results of this censored Tobit model.27 The estimated
coefficients on women’s labor force participation and working time of women (in minutes
per day) are both significant and positive. The coefficient for men’s working time is about
25Throughout this section, we aggregate the four categories of received help under the label “outsourc-
ing”.
26According to Bru¨ck, Haisken-DeNew, and Zimmermann (2003),pp.4, there are about 40.000 officially
registered employees in the household sector in Germany. Estimates, on the contrary, point to about
500.000 employees in the domestic service sector.
27As a further robustness check, we also estimated a Heckman selection model and got very similar
results. Our identifying assumptions were that labor force participation only affects the decision of whether
or not to hire a home help while working time only affects the extent to which a home help is engaged. Other
variables that entered only the selection equation were urbanization of the place of residence, regional GNP
per capita, and the size of the regional service sector. These latter variables affect the regional availability
of household services.
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as large. As expected from Lemma 2, the more the household members work, the more
household activities are outsourced. Again, we exclude men’s labor force participation
for lack of variation in that variable. Income and the number of children aged 0 to 5
positively affect the amount of paid help. Other significant control variables are education,
urbanization of the place of residence, and regional GNP per capita. The sample size
prohibits the sample split into households with and without children done in Section 3.3.
In order to get an idea of the magnitude of these effects, we calculate the impact of
changes in female market work on purchased hours of home help (Table 6). We use the
same computation method as in Section 3.3. The first (second) column displays the effect
on the outsourcing of housework when the woman enters the labor market and works part
(full) time. The overall effect is an increase by roughly one hour per week, or +263%,
in the case of a switch towards a part time job. The effect of taking up a full time job
is slightly smaller. This unexpected result arises because outsourcing is a hump-shaped
function of women’s working time. The hump’s peak is between 5 and 6.5 working hours
per day. This finding is robust with respect to different specifications (polynomials of
different order, splines). An increase in the woman’s daily working time by one hour
raises the household’s outsourcing by 12 minutes per week (+18%) (third column). In
absolute terms, the effects may seem small. However, the numbers represent averages over
the whole sample of which 92.4% do not make use of any paid help at all. Furthermore,
our data contain only a fraction of tasks that could possibly be outsourced. For example,
we do not have information on outsourcing of food preparation (going to restaurants,
pizza service), drinks delivery, cleaning and ironing of clothes, kindergartens, nurseries,
and other services that are rendered outside the household.
Table 6: Net Effect of Female Labor Market Participation on Help Received (in minutes
per week)
woman switches from not working to working woman works
...part time ...full time 1 h more
change in received help
absolute +66:44 +66:02 +11:47
relative +263% +260% +18%
In summary, these results strongly corroborate the theoretical predictions from Section
2. An increase in market work implies that households have less time and more money.
The increase in income can be expected to entail a roughly proportional increase in total
expenditures. But this increase is not proportional across different goods. Household
income (and thus total consumer expenditures) increases by roughly one third, when the
woman takes up a full-time job. At the same time, the demand for household services and
other types of paid help rises by more than 260%. As these services are mostly rendered
by unskilled workers, the relative demand for unskilled labor increases in the wake of
increases in working time or labor force participation.
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Table 7: Regression Results
dependent variable: paid help received by the household (in minutes per day)
participation and minutes of work
λf 64.57 ( 4.12)***
ωf 0.2226 ( 2.48)**
ω2f -0.0003191 (-2.15)**
ωm 0.1663 ( 2.16)**
ω2m -0.0001385 (-1.43)
household characteristics
Inc 0.03040 ( 2.49)**
Inc2 -3.43e-7 (-0.39)
Kids0-5 56.63 ( 6.27)***
Kids6-18 3.428 ( 0.58)
AgeAvg 0.6968 ( 1.52)
SchoolY rsAvg 10.89 ( 3.71)***
TrainY rsAvg 7.007 ( 2.03)**
regional characteristics
Urban 31.66 ( 3.38)***
GNP -0.002338 (-3.33)***
TertSec 1.308 ( 1.55)
Weekend 50.80 ( 2.82)***
Constant -890.6 (-9.69)***
Observations 4392 (of which 338 uncensored, 4054 censored)
Note: t statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, 1%.
3.5 Is there a link between labor market participation and unemploy-
ment in the OECD?
In the preceding sections, we looked at micro data and found that the empirical link
between market work, home production and outsourcing behavior of households is in line
with our theoretical model. In this section, we investigate whether the macroeconomic
evidence is consistent with our predictions from Proposition 3. Hence, we directly look at
the reduced form relation between labor supply and unemployment in 23 OECD countries
between 1980 and 2003.28 Appendix 5.2 describes the coverage and sample statistics of
the data.
Our theoretical model predicts that over time and across countries, higher degrees
of labor market participation lead to lower unemployment. Labor market participation
in our model encompasses a higher labor force participation, longer weekly work hours,
or a prolonged work life, caused, e.g., by a higher retirement age. As data on average
28For Turkey, data on working hours are not available.
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retirement age are not available, we use the labor force participation of workers aged 55
to 64 years instead. Additionally, we use a set of control variables described below.
Potential endogeneity of the key variables can be present for various reasons. Unem-
ployment and labor force participation both vary over the business cycle. Both increase
in economic downturns. The counter-cyclicality of labor force participation has become
known as the “added worker” effect: Women enter the labor market in recessions when
their husbands’ incomes decrease or when the husbands loose their jobs. This effect po-
tentially biases our estimates towards zero. Therefore we include GDP growth in the
regression to control for business cycle effects. Another source of endogeneity might be
the belief of some governments that shorter working hours and early retirement schemes
can be used as a cure against unemployment. If these policy measures are realized, then
we expect shorter working hours and lower labor force participation (especially of the
elderly) in countries and years, in which the unemployment problem is more severe. This
would bias our estimates away from zero. Therefore, we control for country fixed effects
that additionally control for time-invariant unobserved country heterogeneity. As a ro-
bustness check, we also used one-period lags of our regressors in the estimation. We take
first differences of all variables in order to avoid problems of spurious correlation.
Another potential bias in our estimates arises if changes in working time affect unit
labor costs, and thereby labor demand and (un)employment (see Footnote 3). In that case,
unemployment and working hours are negatively related independently of the mechanisms
of our model. In order to avoid this potential omitted variables bias, we also account
for unit labor costs. As further control variables, we include an index of employment
protection legislation and union density in order to capture time-variant institutional
country differences that might affect unemployment rates.29
As the value of the dependent variable, the unemployment rate, must always lie within
the unit interval, we use a logistic specification:
UR =
eβ0+βp·λall+β55·λ55++βh·ω+
P
k γk·xk
1 + eβ0+βp·λall+β55·λ55++βh·ω+
P
k γk·xk
(21)
where UR is the unemployment rate, λall is the rate of labor force participation in the
entire population, λ55+ is the participation rate of persons aged 55 to 64 years, ω are
average yearly working hours, and xk denotes one of a set of k additional regressors. In
order to estimate this non-linear relation with linear estimation methods, we make the
transformation:
URlogistic = ln
(
UR
1− UR
)
= β0 + βp · λall + βo · λ55+ + βh · ω +
∑
k
γk · xk. (22)
29See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) for a detailed discussion of the institutional determinants of unem-
ployment rates in Europe.
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Table 8: Regression results
dependent Variable: unemployment rate (logistic)
(1) (2) (3)
Participation (all) -7.742 (-6.39)*** -8.183 (-5.81)*** -7.194 (-4.05)***
Participation (55-64 years) -0.620 (-1.02) -0.349 (-0.52) -0.219 (-0.24)
Working Hours -12.990 (-3.53)*** -8.835 (-2.35)** -8.005 (-1.68)*
GDP growth p.c. -0.339 (-0.93) -0.580 (-1.20)
Empl. Protection Legislation 0.114 (1.07) 0.055 (0.50)
Union Density 0.039 (4.90)*** 0.049 (4.72)***
Unit Labor Cost 0.004 (0.90)
Constant 0.009 (1.19) 0.020 (2.33)** 0.009 (0.94)
No. Obs. (No. Countries) 449 (23) 354 (21) 261 (19)
Adj. R2 0.08 0.17 0.14
Note: t statistics in parentheses. **,*** denote significance at 5%, 1%. All variables are in first differences.
In all specifications, we estimate fixed-effects models.
Table 8 displays the regression results. We estimate three specifications: (1) contains
the variables of interest only, and (2) additionally includes the described control variables
per capita GDP growth, employment protection legislation, and union density rates. Col-
umn (3) additionally accounts for unit labor costs. We introduce unit labor costs in a
separate specification, because it reduces our sample size quite substantially. All three
columns show a significant link between total labor force participation and working hours
and the unemployment rate.30 This is consistent with our theory. Labor force partic-
ipation of older workers turns out insignificant. One explanation might be that many
OECD countries have or had generous pre-retirement schemes in place such that at least
those still participating beyond age 60 are a strongly selected group.31 If increases in the
participation rates of the elderly arise from a tightening of social security systems, then
this may induce less skilled and less wealthy people to work longer. If this is the case,
then we do not expect substantial increases in outsourcing or sizeable reductions of the
unemployment rate. We also conducted robustness checks using additional explanatory
variables like the degree of wage inequality, and the replacement rate of unemployment
benefits. Our results turn out to be robust with respect to these alternative specifications.
30The weak significance of working hours in the third specification is due to the sample reduction by
more than a quarter.
31For example, those who did not spend many years on earning a degree or getting tertiary education,
started their working life early and can retire earliest—at least in Germany.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduce a new argument into the debate about the employment effects
of labor market policy measures targeted at increasing working time, retirement age, and
labor force participation: We develop a general equilibrium model showing that positive
employment effects for the unskilled can arise from general increases in labor supply.
The mechanism how these jobs might accrue works through the goods market. We
argue that changes in individuals’ labor supply entail changes in the composition of their
consumer demand. Longer working hours and higher labor force participation imply that
workers have higher incomes and less time for leisure and home production. As a con-
sequence, home production decreases, and the demand composition shifts towards those
goods and services that substitute for home production. As the goods and services that
can be produced by everyone at home require few skills, the relative demand for unskilled
labor rises. If the relative wage does not adjust perfectly to changes in relative labor
demand, unemployment among the unskilled falls.
In the second part of the paper, we produce empirical evidence that corroborates our
theoretical results. We use a time use survey conducted in West German households in
1991/92 to explore the main mechanisms of the model empirically: The link between
labor supply and home production and the link between labor supply and outsourcing of
household services and other home-producible goods and services. We find quantitatively
relevant effects of labor force participation and work hours on both, time spent on home
production by the household and outsourcing of these tasks among working age couples.
One additional hour in market work of the woman crowds out 27 minutes of the household’s
home production per day. Accordingly, outsourcing rises by 12 minutes per week (+18%).
Switching from not working to working full time results in a reduction of home production
time of about 3 and a half hours per day. As a consequence, outsourcing rises by more
than one hour (+260%). These effects imply that increases in market work can have large
positive effects on the demand for unskilled labor.
At the macroeconomic level, we additionally investigated the link between labor market
participation and unemployment rates directly. Controlling for some institutional deter-
minants of unemployment rates, we find a strongly significant and negative relationship
for 23 OECD countries from 1980 to 2003. We take this as further evidence in favor of
our model.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs
5.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
At p = 0, the right hand side (RHS) of equation (16) is larger than the left hand side
(LHS):
e1+χ
1 + χ
· ξ = RHS (0) ≥ LHS (0) =

0 ⇔ γ > 0
1
3 · e
1+χ
(1+θ)·(1+χ) · ξ ⇔ γ = 0
e1+χ
(1+θ)·(1+χ) · ξ ⇔ γ < 0
The limit of the right hand side for p→∞ is smaller than the limit of the left hand side:
−∞ = lim
p→∞RHS (p) < limp→∞LHS (p) =∞
Both sides of the equation are continuous in p. Therefore, at least one p must exist that
makes both sides equal. This establishes the existence of the general equilibrium.
As stated in Section 2.4, we only consider parameter constellations for which pro-
duction in both sectors is strictly positive. This requires for the relative goods’ price:
p ∈ [1, eχ]. Within these limits, aggregate demand for good 2 is increasing in the rela-
tive price of good 1, p, while aggregate supply of good 2 is decreasing in p. Thus, if an
equilibrium price p exists, it must be unique.
5.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The equilibrium condition is C2 (p (ξ) , ξ) = Y2 (p (ξ) , ξ). Let ηu,v = ∂u∂v · vu denote the
relative effect of u on v. Comparative statics with respect to ξ yields:
ηp,ξ = −ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ
ηY2,p − ηC2,p
The denominator is negative (see the proof of uniqueness in Appendix 5.1.1). How about
the numerator?
ηY2,ξ = 1 and ηC2,ξ = 1−
(p·α)
1
1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
C2
so that
ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ =
(p·α)
1
1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
C2
> 0
which implies that
ηp,ξ = −
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ
ηY2,p − ηC2,p︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
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5.1.3 Proof of Proposition 3
From Lemma 1 we know that unemployment is decreasing with the relative goods price
p. Together with Proposition 2 this implies that a reduction in market work ξ leads to an
increase in unemployment j˜.
Next, we have to show that the effect of market work ξ on unemployment j˜ is stronger,
the smaller is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure σ :
∂
∣∣∣ηj˜,ξ∣∣∣
∂σ
< 0 ⇔
∂
(
ηj˜,ξ
)
∂σ
> 0
Market work ξ affects unemployment only through the relative goods price p (see equation
8):
ηj˜,ξ = ηj˜,p · ηp,ξ
The effect of the relative goods price p on unemployment j˜ does not depend on the sub-
stitution elasticity σ (see Lemma 1):
∂
(
ηj˜,ξ
)
∂σ
=
∂
(
ηj˜,p
)
∂σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
· ηp,ξ︸︷︷︸
<0
+ ηj˜,p︸︷︷︸
<0
· ∂ (ηp,ξ)
∂σ
?
> 0
It suffices thus to show that
∂(ηp,ξ)
∂σ < 0.
∂ (ηp,ξ)
∂σ
= −
∂(ηY2,ξ−ηC2,ξ)
∂σ · (ηY2,p − ηC2,p)− (ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ) ·
∂(ηY2,p−ηC2,p)
∂σ
(ηY2,p − ηC2,p)2
?
< 0
From Appendix 5.1.2 we know that ηY2,p − ηC2,p < 0, ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ > 0 and that
ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ =
(pα)
1
1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
α
γ
1−γ
C2
=
pα
ξpα ln
(
θ
1+θ
χp
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
p(1+χ)
)
+ χp
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
(1+θ)(1+χ) ξ + (1− ξ) pα
independent of σ = 11−γ . Therefore
∂(ηY2,ξ−ηC2,ξ)
∂σ = 0.
All that remains to be shown is that
∂(ηY2,p−ηC2,p)
∂σ < 0. From equation 6 follows that
∂(ηY2,p)
∂σ = 0.
ηC2,p =
∂
 (p·α) γ1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ

∂p
p
(p·α)
γ
1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
+
∂Λ
∂p
p
Λ
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where Λ =
(
ξ · p · α · ln
(
θ
1+θ · χ·p
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
p·(1+χ)
)
+ χ·p
1+χ
χ +e1+χ
(1+θ)·(1+χ) · ξ + (1− ξ) · p · α
)
does not
depend on γ.
∂
 (p·α) γ1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ

∂p
p
(p·α)
γ
1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ
=
γ
1− γ ·
1 + α
γ
1−γ
1 +
(
1 + p
γ
1−γ
)
· α γ1−γ
It suffices to show that
∂ (ηC2,p)
∂σ
=
∂
 γ
1−γ · 1+α
γ
1−γ
1+
„
1+p
γ
1−γ
«
·α
γ
1−γ

∂σ
> 0
With γ1−γ = σ − 1 :
∂ (ηC2,p)
∂σ
=
1 + ασ−1
1 + (1 + pσ−1) · ασ−1 − (σ − 1)
(
lnα+
(
1 + ασ−1
) · ln p) · (α · p)σ−1
(1 + (1 + pσ−1) · ασ−1)2
For σ ≤ 1 (with α > 1), the right hand side is unambiguously positive:
∂ (ηC2,p)
∂σ
> 0
For σ > 1, this inequality can only be established numerically because the relative goods
price p is endogenous and cannot be expressed as an explicit function of the exogenous
parameters.
Numerical simulations for α ∈ [1, 10] , χ ∈ [0, 10] , µ ∈ [0, 1] , γ ∈ [0, 1) (implying
σ ∈ [1,∞)), and ξ ∈ [0, 1] confirm that the inequality also holds for σ > 1.
This completes the proof:
∂ (ηp,ξ)
∂σ
= −
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂ (ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ)
∂σ
·
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ηY2,p − ηC2,p)
(ηY2,p − ηC2,p)2
+
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(ηY2,ξ − ηC2,ξ) ·
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂ (ηY2,p − ηC2,p)
∂σ
(ηY2,p − ηC2,p)2
< 0
and therefore:
∂
(
ηj˜,ξ
)
∂σ
=
∂
(
ηj˜,p
)
∂σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
· ηp,ξ︸︷︷︸
<0
+ ηj˜,p︸︷︷︸
<0
· ∂ (ηp,ξ)
∂σ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
> 0
5.2 Description of the data
This Appendix contains a description of the variables used in Section 3, sample statistics
and a description of the unbalanced panel of OECD countries.
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Table 9: Description of the Variables
Time Use Survey (Zeitbudgeterhebung) 1991/92
hp total household home production (in minutes per day)
rh paid help received by the household (in minutes per week)
λ employment status (= 0 if not employed, = 1 if employed)
ω time spent on gainful employment (in minutes per day)
Kids0− 5 number of children in the household aged 0 − 5 years
Kids6− 18 number of children in the household aged 6 − 18 years
SchoolY rsAvg average years of schooling of wife and husband
SchoolY rsDiff difference in schooling years between husband and wife
TrainY ears years of vocational training
Inc household income
Inc2 household income squared
AgeAvg average age of wife and husband
AgeDiff difference between the husband’s and the wife’s age
Mid region dummy (North Rhine-Westphalia, Hessen)
South region dummy
(Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria)
Urban degree of urbanization of the region
GNP per capita gross national product in the region
TertSec employment share of the tertiary sector
Weekend weekend dummy (= 1 if the interview was on a weekend)
UnempR unemployment rate in the region
OECD Data 1980-2003
Participation (all) Participation rate (Labor Force 20-65/Population 20-65)
Participation (55-64 yrs) Participation rate (aged 55-64)
Working Hours Share of average annual working hours in total annual hours (8760)
GDP growth p.c GDP growth per capita
Employment Protection Legislation EPL index, ranging from 1 to 20 (20=strictest regulation)
Union Density Share of union members among dependent workers (in %)
Sources: OECD Labour Force Statistics, World Development Indicators
Table 10: Data coverage in the unbalanced panel of OECD countries
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland
1980 - 2003 1997 - 2003 1985 - 2003 1980 - 2003 1985 - 2003 1980 - 2003
France Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy
1980 - 2003 1993 - 2003 1985 - 2002 1993 - 2002 1985 - 2003 1980 - 2003
Japan Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal
1980 - 2003 1985 - 2002 1989 - 2003 1989 - 2003 1980 - 2003 1988 - 2003
Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States
1980 - 2003 1980 - 2003 1993 - 2003 – 1986 - 2003 1980 - 2003
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics: OECD Data
Sample mean Sample minimum Sample maximum
Unemployment Rate 0.076 0.015 (LUX, 1991) 0.240 (ESP, 1994)
Participation Rate (all) 0.709 0.576 (NL, 1980) 0.866 (ICE, 2000)
Participation Rate (55-64 years) 0.484 0.222 (BEL, 1990) 0.887 (ICE, 1995)
Working Hours 0.195 0.153 (NOR, 2003) 0.242 (JAP, 1980)
GDP Growth Rate p.c. 0.022 -0.069 (FIN, 1991) 0.010 (IRE, 1997)
Union Density Rate 40.204 8.600 (ESP, 1984) 87.40 (SWE, 1994)
Employment Protection Rate 2.119 0.200 (USA, all yrs) 4.800 (POR, all yrs)
5.3 Income
In the Time Use Survey, income is recorded in the form of a range card question, i.e.,
the respondents report their income in predefined intervals instead of being asked the
precise amount. This survey design is often chosen to achieve a higher response rate
(Juster and Smith 1997; Winter 2002). In order to assign the household a continuous
income, we combine the information about the lower and upper limits of the respective
income intervals with additional information on household and personal characteristics.
Interval-coded data can then be treated like an ordered response, where the cut-points
are already known. We define a latent (continuous) variable income Inc∗ = xβ + e where
e|x ∼ N(0, 1). If α1 < Inc∗ ≤ α2, the observed income class is for example Inc = 2 with
the limits α1 and α2, and so forth. In the case of interval-coded data, these cut-points
α are already known, so that only the parameters β have to be estimated. The standard
normal assumption made above changes to Inc∗|x ∼ N(xβ, σ2) where σ2 = V ar(Inc∗|x)
is assumed not to depend on x. β and σ2 can then be estimated by maximum likelihood
(Wooldridge 2002).
Table 12 (a) and (b) reports the regression results for men’s and women’s income.
We use these results to assign each household member its predicted continuous income
given her characteristics and income bracket. Then, we add up these individual incomes
to obtain the household’s income. Thus, we improve upon the common method of just
choosing the midpoints as the income measure. However, like the midpoint approach,
this more sophisticated method of generating a (continuous) income regressor and using
it in the estimation of home production time and paid help can be problematic. While
the usual OLS assumption that ² is uncorrelated with the x suffices for consistency in
Sections 3.3 and 3.4, the inference will generally be invalid because we ignore the sampling
variation in Înc. Generally, the uncertainty in the estimate should be accounted for in
the regression of interest. See Wooldridge (2002), chapter 6 for a discussion of generated
regressors and chapter 14 for a general framework for handling these problems. In our
case, the sampling variation in Înc is very small. First, it is considerably lower than when
using the midpoints, because we do not only use the income bracket information, but also
the additional individual characteristics, x. Second, we observe relatively narrow income
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brackets which alone are already good income predictors. For these reasons, we do not
adjust the inference in the second step.
Table 12: Regression results for (a) women’s and (b) men’s income, ordered probit with
known cut-points
(a) women’s income (b) men’s income
λf -474.9722 (10.29) *** λm -1462.273 (5.18) ***
ωf 1.492634 (29.69) *** ωm 2.057012 (11.00) ***
ωf
2 -0.0002054 (15.26) *** ωm
2 -0.0002412 (7.70) ***
AGEf 3.28296 (0.33) AGEm 166.2939 (9.53) ***
AGEf
2 0.0238836 (0.20) AGEm
2 -1.670301 (8.22) ***
SchoolY rsf 522.7379 (3.55) *** SchoolY rsm 1469.907 (6.08) ***
SchoolY rsf
2 -21.72323 (3.24) *** SchoolY rsm
2 -57.73957 (5.21) ***
TrainY rsf -37.34202 (1.63) TrainY rsm 33.40076 (0.62)
TrainY rsf
2 33.25985 (6.67) *** TrainY rsm
2 39.11736 (3.93) ***
Urban 58.76952 (3.04) *** Urban 101.0078 (3.16) ***
GNP 0.0062472 (3.67) *** GNP 0.0035232 (1.27)
UnempR -21.75875 (3.43) *** UnempR -24.28667 (2.34) **
Weekend 43.99512 (1.96) ** Weekend -6.385638 (0.17)
Constant -3311.774 (4.02) *** Constant -11815.06 (8.79) ***
Observations 4110 Observations 4268
Standard deviations in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Section 3.3
This subsection reports the results of estimating a fixed effects model on the time spent
on home production. We observe every household’s time use over two diary days and
use this panel structure in order to estimate a fixed effects model that filters unobserved
heterogeneity.
Table 13: Fixed effects regression
dependent variable: total household home production
ωf -.5561986 (-14.48) *** ωm -.3266689 (-11.67) ***
ηf
2 -41.30521 (-2.64) *** ηm
2 -17.01301 (-1.12)
Tuesday -3.40505 (-0.33) Friday 18.91802 (1.16)
Wednesday -.6622015 (-0.05) Saturday -41.88183 (-2.30) **
Thursday 25.74003 (1.63) Sunday -280.6594 (-16.93) ***
Constant 799.7208 (40.47) ***
Obs. 4304 Overall R2 0.30
t statistics in parenthesis. ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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